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RADICAL DEMOCRACY AND MODERNITY
My intention in this paper is to present some reflections on the current 
debate about modernity and post-modernity, specifically from  the point of 
view o f the radical democratic project. My aim is to show that the critique 
of rationalism, the critique of the founding subject, of the unified totality and 
a series of other themes which are usually related to the so-called post-modern 
critique do not have to lead necessarily to political conservatism, as some 
people —  the best known is Habermas — have argued, but that it is on the 
contrary the very condition to think of the political in a really new and more 
adequate way and to be able to articulate a project of radical and plural 
democracy.
Let’s begin with the term »modernity«. I’ve used the terms »modern« and 
»post-m odern«, but must say that I am far from being happy with them. And 
in fact the first thing I want to do is to scrutinize them and in this way to 
proceed to their deconstruction. First let’s see what we understand by »mo­
dernity«.
I think there are almost as many definitions of modernity as authors 
using the term. And according to what components are seen as defining mo­
dernity and the type of relation which is established among them, we have, 
of course, very different conceptions of what modernity is and obviously as 
a consequence of what our attitude to modernity should be. Usually the main 
components that we find defining or related to modernity are, Enlightenment, 
rationalism, democracy, capitalism, liberalism, individualism, universalism ; so, 
basically we can, in fact, put them into three categories: On one side we have 
democratic politics, on the other side rationalist universalic epistemology and 
there is a third component which is, of course, not present in all definitions 
of modernity, which is the component referring to capitalism. For somebody 
like Habermas, the central positive aspect to be defended is democratic politics 
and he believes that this can only be done through the defence of rationalism 
and universalism. And for him what is really the obstacle — the danger or 
the wrong thing in modernity —  is capitalism and we’ve got to try to find a 
way to really limit or get rid of the effects of capitalism. From somebody like 
Richard Rorty, we get a different picture, because he identifies Enlightenment
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with liberalism and with democracy. All those aspects for him are positive 
and must be defended.
The specificity of Rorty’s position is that he affirms that they are inde­
pendent of rationalism and universalism, and those are for him the negative 
aspects that need to be dropped. So, in fact, following Blumenberg, Rorty 
made a distinction in Enlightenment between self-assertion and self-grounding.
Self-assertion is a political project of democracy, self-grounding, an episte- 
mological one, and he says that they are not necessarily related, so we can 
perfectly well get rid of one while defending the other. Hence he proposes to 
get rid of universalism and rationalism.
We still have a very different picture with somebody like Alsdair MacIn­
tyre in his very influental book A fter Virtue where he is calling modernity 
into question. Because MacIntyre identifies modernity with liberal indivi­
dualism plus rationalist epistemology, he affirms that the whole project of 
the Enlightenment and modernity was a mistake. It failed and now w e should 
go back to Aristotle. Still another point of view can be found as the conser­
vative critique of modernity of the Burkean type and here, of course, both 
democratic politics and rationalist and universalist epistemology must be 
questioned and abandoned. Thus, you can see that one can define modernity 
in different ways and have a very different attitude towards it according to 
these definitions.
I think that the real question is: is there a necessary link between the 
political and the epistemological aspect of the Enlightenment? And: Can we 
defend advances of one side — that is democratic politics —  while criticizing 
rationalism and humanism? I am going to follow  Rorty because I believe he 
is right in saying that they are not necessarily linked. They were articulated 
at a given moment, but they are not necessarily linked. And therefore it is 
perfectly possible to abandon rationalism and humanism while defending de­
mocratic politics, which is, of course, what Habermas believed, is impossible. 
But I want to say something more about that distinction: modern — post­
modern. Because usually what is refered to as post-modern in this kind of 
field — because post-modern again is used in so many different ways, depending 
on whether we are going to speak of aesthetics, or architecture, or anything 
referring to the field of politics and philosophy —  is really a series of trends 
which have in common a critique of the rationalism and the humanism of 
the Enlightenment, of what we have called essentialism. We find here very 
different traditions, because within the category of post-modern we can put 
not only what is usually called post-structuralism, but also post-Heideggerian 
phenomenology (and Gadamer certainly belongs to that) and also Wittgen- 
steinian language philosophy and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Thus, it’s a very 
wide field. The thing that they’ve all got in common is the critique of essen­
tialism. I want to argue that in fact, the distinction modern— post-modern 
is not very useful. And it is artificial. Because a double logic operated from 
the start of modernity and it we see it from  that point of view, one could 
say that the very principle of post-modernity was already present at the birth 
of modernity. I think that it becomes clear when w e realize that the best level 
to distinguish the emergence of modernity (here again there are many different 
levels) is at the level of the political. I’ve used the term »political« in the sense 
in which in France we distinguish between »le politique« and »la politique«, 
»la politique« being a much more global term which has really to do with
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the symbolic ordering o f social relations and I think that that’s really the cru­
cial level to define the emergence of modernity.
And if we agree to define the emergence of modernity at the level, clearly, 
of course, w e’ve got to conclude that the central event for the emergence of 
modernity was the democratic revolution. That’s the term, of course, that 
comes from  Tocqueville. W e have used it in our book to indicate the moment 
when the democratic principle of liberty and equality becomes the new matrix 
of the political imagination and begins to constitute the fundamental point in 
the construction of the political. That is when the logic of equivalence becomes 
the dominant one. But in this paper I’m going to refer to that term »demo­
cratic revolution« in a slightly different way. Because I’m referring really to 
its use by Claude Lefort who has shown that the democratic revolution was 
the beginning of what he calls a new mode of institution of the social. For 
Lefort modern democratic society is basically a society in which there is a 
dissolution, of the landmarks of certainty. It is a society in which power be­
comes an empty space and is separated from law and knowledge, and that is 
something which is linked to the fact that there is a break with a kind of 
political logic which was typical of the ancien régime, and that has been quali­
fied of theological political logic; there was a cosmos, and order that was 
grounded either in divine will or in nature, and it was a hierarchical type of 
society, in which there was one single logic, in which power, law and know­
ledge were united. For Lefort the emergence of the modern democratic society 
is the separation o f those three levels and the fact that power becomes an 
empty space; as a consequence, power, law and knowledge are therefore 
exposed to a radical indeterminacy. And that is for Lefort the main characte­
ristic of modern democratic society — the fact of radical indeterminacy. Such 
a society becomes the theatre of an uncontrolable adventure, so that what is 
instituted never becomes definitively established, the known always remains 
undermined by the unknown and the present proves to be undefinable. With 
the emergence of the democratic revolution there is no more possibility of 
providing a final guarantee, a definite legitimation, and that’s because there 
is no more power incorporated in the person of the prince and related to a 
transcendental instance. An important consequence of that is that the possi­
bility of a society defined as a substance having an organic identity disappears. 
From then on there is only a society whose shape and nature escape to a ge­
neral knowledge that could be uttered from an unique view point. I think that 
if we accept the democratic revolution as being the central feature of moder­
nity, it is evident that what is now called post-modernity is in fact only the 
recognition of that impossibility of final grounding, of establishing a suture 
which is constitutive of the very advent of m odem democratic societies. So, 
it’s not a new stage, it’s something that was present at the very emergence of 
that society. But, of course, what takes place today is the recognition of that 
impossibility, after the failure o f different attempts to replace the traditional 
transcendental grounding in God or in Nature, which were the pre-modern 
ones, by an alternative grounding in man and his reason. And, of course, that’s 
the epistemological project of the Enlightenment. But it’s a project that was 
doomed to fail from  the beginning because of the very characteristic of the 
democratic revolution: the indeterminacy and impossibility of final grounding. 
So, what is seen today as a crisis of rationalism and humanism and the post­
modern critique, is only the crisis of a particular project within modernity.
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Nietzsche, for instance, was the first one to recognize that when he said that 
death of God is already death of man, we could not replace God or Nature 
by man, it was impossible, it was doomed to fail, as I’ve just said. But, of 
course, that does not mean that because there is that crisis of rationalism 
and humanism, we have to give up the political aspect of modernity and the 
gains of the democratic revolution, or that — and that’s the fear of Haber­
mas — it is the very project of modernity that is undermined by the critique 
of rationalism. I think that to believe that is really to remain trapped in the 
very problematic of rationalism, that people are trying to avoid. And that, 
of course, is true for Habermas, but it is true also for several post-modern 
authors, for instance Lyotard. It is not because w e cannot ground the rights 
of man on a human essence, that we should not fight to defend and extend 
them. Or is it not because, as MacIntyre very convincingly argued, the project 
to ground morality in reason has failed, that we should give up morality and 
that everything becomes possible. I think, there’s a kind of apocalyptic pathos 
in some post-modern thinkers, which is the reverse of the rationalism that 
they oppose and still live from the very rationalistic metaphysics which they 
set off to destroy. And there are ways in which we can think about morality 
and rights, which are not linked to the problematic of rationalism and huma­
nism. For such a project there are conservative authors who are quite useful, 
for instance Gadamer and Oakeshott. In their critique of Enlightenment ratio­
nalism they show us how to think about morality and politics in a new way. 
And contrary to what some people say about their revalorization of the concept 
o f tradition, it does not necessarily have conservative consequence. Of course, 
we can’t just take the concept of tradition in Oakeshott and Gadamer as it is, 
but we can reformulate it in terms of the language game of Wittgenstein, and 
also introduce Gramsci’s idea of articulation— disarticulation. If we do that 
we could perfectly arrive at a concept of tradition seen not as monolithic 
Burkean traditionalism but as a multiplicity of heterogeneous discourses that 
open the way to many different uses and strategies. So tradition can be arti­
culated in a left wing direction or in a right wing direction and the political 
project should be within tradition to try to establish different kinds of arti­
culation. Such a conception has been accused of relativism. I agree with Rorty 
when he says that the real question is not between people who think that one 
view is as good as any other, the so called relativists, and people who do not, 
but between those who think our culture, our purposes and institutions cannot 
be supported except conversationally and people who still search for some other 
sort of support and attempt to establish some final grounding. It is only within 
the problematic of rationalism that relativism makes sense, and the critique 
of Enlightenment rationalism does not lead necessarily to irrationalism and 
relativism and to the destruction of the political project od modernity.
There is another way in which the critique of modernity is taking place. 
And it is taking place basically among the political philosophers in USA and 
it’s the so-called Communitarian critique of liberal individualism. The main 
target is John Rawls (Rawls’ well-known book is Theory of Justice) who is 
the most sophisticated liberal philosopher today. The communitarians want to 
attack liberalism, because they believe that liberalism is essentially individualist 
and that, as a consequence of the hegemony of liberal individualism in the 
USA, there has been an erosion of solidarities, and that individualism has today 
reached the point in which the very social fabric is called into question. They
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consider that there is an urgent need to fight against that liberal individualism 
and to recover another traditon which is the tradition of civic republicanism. 
That tradition has just been rediscovered in the States, because for a long 
time people believed that the USA was completely dominated from the begin­
ning on by Lockean liberalism, and the American revolution was seen in that 
light. But recent American historiography has shown on the contrary that 
the American revolution had been very influenced by the presence of that 
civic republican or civic humanist type of tradition. The communitarians pro­
pose to criticize liberal individualism and revive a sense of citizenship, through 
the reactivation of that civic republican tradition which was present at the 
time of the American revolution, but went underground later on when libera­
lism in the 19th century became the dominant ideology.
What I want to argue with respect to the communitarians is that there is 
a serious problem in their attempt to revive the civic republican tradition. 
On the one hand, I think, it’s an interesting critique of modernity, you see, of 
course, that in this case it’s a different way again to define modernity, it’s 
really modernity seen in term o f liberal individualism, hence they are against 
it. But their solution — the revival of the civic republican tradition is very 
problematic, indeed. —  First: It is a completely heteroclit notion that has been 
defined by Pocock (who has been one of the main theorists of its reconstruction 
in his book The Machiavellian Moment) as a synthesis of Aristotle and Machia­
velli, which is already rather curious because whether we accentuate the 
Machiavellian aspect or the Aristotelian aspect, we can really come to very 
different proposals. And the problem is that most of the people have really 
accentuated the Aristotelian aspect. People like Sandel and MacIntyre, for 
instance, propose in fact to go back to some kind of pre-modern form of 
politics. They are against liberalism, against individualism and, of course, 
against pluralism and the very idea of rights and they want to go back to 
a kind of politics based on the community unified by one single moral order, 
by one single common good. I think that’s extremly dangerous because if it is 
true that there are things we criticize in liberal individualism, we cannot 
criticize them by just going back before liberalism, before the democratic re­
volution. We cannot sacrifice the individual to the citizen, but we must find 
the way to articulate them: that’s really the crucial problem for a new modern 
democratic political philosophy. And it is from that point of view that our 
project of radical and plural democracy seems to me to be addressing those 
issues. I agree that there are serious problems with liberal individualism but 
the solution is not simply to replace liberal individualism by the civic republican 
tradition. There are important elements in both traditions that must be incor­
porated into a new public philosophy and that is what a project of radical 
democracy is attempting to do in a way that I want to indicate as a conclusion.
I think, first, that a new political philosophy requires a conception of the 
subject, which is neither the Rawlsian »unencumbered self«, nor the Commu­
nitarian »situated« one. Because in both cases they maintain the idea of the 
unitary subject, and that’s the real problem. Many Communitarians seem to 
believe that we belong only to one community, empirically and geographically 
defined, and that it could be unified by one single idea of the common good. 
But we, in fact, always belong to a multiplicity of communities, we are always 
multiple and contradictory subjects and the multiplicity of the community to 
which we belong is as wide as the social relations we participate in and the
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subject positions they define. So, we are constructed by a variety of discourses 
and always precariously and temporarily sutured at the intersection of all 
those subject positions. I think that such a conception of the subject is crucial 
for radical democratic politics, because only such a conception allows us to 
theorize the multiplicity of relations, of subordination o f which a single indi­
vidual can be a bearer, and to understand the fact that one can be dominant 
in one type of social relation while subordinated into another, then understand­
ing the range o f social relations where the extension of the democratic prin­
ciples is needed. It is also necessary to give up the idea of a unique space 
of constitution of the political which is common both to the liberal and the 
civic republican tradition because it’s inadequate. W e are witnessing today a 
politization far more radical than in the past with the proliferation of radically 
new and different political spaces, we are confronted with the emergence of 
a plurality of subjects whose form  o f construction and diversity it is only 
possible to think if we really abolish the category of the subject as unified 
essence. That’s why, I believe that — far from  putting into question the very 
project of modernity — the democratic project —  the post-modern critique 
of essentialism provide the very condition to further that project today because 
it provides the very condition for understanding the way in which politics 
must be formulated and rethought if we want to take into account the widening 
of social conflicts that is characteristic of the new social movements in the two 
last decades. Contrary to Habermas, who believes that the only w ay to further 
the democratic project is to stick to the rationalism and universalism of the 
Enlightenment, I want to argue that if we do not abandon that universalism 
and that rationalism and take over the post-modern critique, we are not going 
to be able to understand what is happening politically, we are not going to 
be able to formulate an adequate conception o f politics. Therefore that post­
modern critique is in fact the very condition for furthering the modern project 
today and the project of radical democracy is really both modern and post­
modern because it wants to further the modern democratic revolution using 
the tools of the post-modern critique.
